The Deadly Legacy of UXO in Laos
Laos is ‘contaminated’ by UXO (unexploded ordinance) which kills and maims people and renders land unusable. Laos accounts for more than half of all confirmed
- History
Operation Lam Son 719
Objective
The Lam Son 719 operation was a controversial military campaign launched in February 1971 by the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN), with substantial air and artillery support from the United States. The operation’s objective was to disrupt the North Vietnamese Army’s (NVA) logistical buildup in Laos and sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
The initial target was Sepon, a strategically important town at the junction of supply routes 9 and 92, approximately 42 kilometres inside Laos. The plan was to drive west from Khe Sanh, a former US Marine base, cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail, seize Sepon, destroy NVA forces and supplies, and then return to South Vietnam. The operation would also serve as a crucial test of President Nixon’s Vietnamization policy, which aimed to equip and train the South Vietnamese to fight independently, paving the way for the withdrawal of US troops.
The initial target was Sepon, a strategically important town at the junction of supply routes 9 and 92, approximately 42 kilometres inside Laos. The plan was to drive west from Khe Sanh, a former US Marine base, cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail, seize Sepon, destroy NVA forces and supplies, and then return to South Vietnam. The operation would also serve as a crucial test of President Nixon’s Vietnamization policy, which aimed to equip and train the South Vietnamese to fight independently, paving the way for the withdrawal of US troops.
Planning and Preparation
Months before the operation, the ARVN I Corps, responsible for the northernmost region of South Vietnam, relocated its headquarters from Da Nang to Dong Ha, a former US base near the Laotian border. This move was part of a broader effort to build up logistics and deceive the NVA about the impending operation.
The ARVN amassed a significant force, and the operation was meticulously planned, with detailed instructions for troop deployments, artillery support, and air operations. However, inaccurate intelligence, leaked information, and disagreements among high-ranking officers hampered the planning process.
The ARVN amassed a significant force, and the operation was meticulously planned, with detailed instructions for troop deployments, artillery support, and air operations. However, inaccurate intelligence, leaked information, and disagreements among high-ranking officers hampered the planning process.
Intelligence Failures and Leaked Information
Despite extensive aerial reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, the ARVN severely underestimated the strength and preparedness of the NVA in southern Laos. They initially believed that only one or two NVA divisions were active in the area, failing to anticipate potential reinforcements from the Laotian-North Vietnamese border.
The operation’s secrecy was compromised early on. The extensive preparations, including the movement of troops and supplies, alerted NVA intelligence. Additionally, the translation of operational plans inadvertently provided the NVA with detailed information about the operation. Communist sympathizers among the translators leaked the documents to Hanoi, giving the NVA ample time to reinforce their positions and plan their defences.
The NVA moved many AAA guns into the hills on either side of Highway 9, knowing that any invasion force would require support from US helicopters. This decision proved decisive, as over 100 helicopters were shot down during the operation while another 630 were damaged so much they had to be dismantled.
The operation’s secrecy was compromised early on. The extensive preparations, including the movement of troops and supplies, alerted NVA intelligence. Additionally, the translation of operational plans inadvertently provided the NVA with detailed information about the operation. Communist sympathizers among the translators leaked the documents to Hanoi, giving the NVA ample time to reinforce their positions and plan their defences.
The NVA moved many AAA guns into the hills on either side of Highway 9, knowing that any invasion force would require support from US helicopters. This decision proved decisive, as over 100 helicopters were shot down during the operation while another 630 were damaged so much they had to be dismantled.
Launch of the Operation and Initial Successes
On February 8, 1971, the ARVN crossed the Laotian border and secured Objective A Luoi, a strategic point along Route 9. The initial phase of the operation saw rapid progress, with ARVN forces encountering relatively light resistance. They captured Ban Dong, midway between the border and Sepon, and discovered large caches of Soviet-made weapons, fuel, uniforms, and food. However, the ARVN advance along Route 9 stalled five kilometres beyond Fire Support Base A Luoi. This delay allowed the NVA to regroup and reinforce their positions, shifting the momentum of the battle.
Mounting Resistance and the Fall of FSBs
The NVA, now aware of the ARVN’s intentions and equipped with detailed knowledge of the operation’s plans, launched a series of counterattacks. They targeted the ARVN fire support bases (FSBs), employing a strategy of isolation and overwhelming firepower. The ARVN Rangers, positioned north of Route 9, were the first to face the brunt of the NVA offensive. FSB Ranger North came under heavy attack. The Rangers were overrun despite fierce resistance and air support from US gunships and flare ships. Outnumbered and outgunned, the ARVN was decimated, with heavy casualties and the loss of the FSB.
The fall of Ranger North exposed the northern flank of the Airborne Division, making FSBs 31 and 30 the next targets for the NVA. FSB 31, housing the headquarters of the 3rd Airborne Brigade, was defended by a depleted force of paratroopers and a 105mm howitzer battery. The NVA launched a massive assault involving an estimated 2,000 infantry and 20 tanks. Despite initial success in repelling the attack with the help of US airpower, the paratroopers were eventually overrun. The brigade commander and his entire staff were captured.
The fall of Ranger North exposed the northern flank of the Airborne Division, making FSBs 31 and 30 the next targets for the NVA. FSB 31, housing the headquarters of the 3rd Airborne Brigade, was defended by a depleted force of paratroopers and a 105mm howitzer battery. The NVA launched a massive assault involving an estimated 2,000 infantry and 20 tanks. Despite initial success in repelling the attack with the help of US airpower, the paratroopers were eventually overrun. The brigade commander and his entire staff were captured.
The Capture and Retreat from Sepon
In a bid to salvage the operation and counter the negative press coverage, the ARVN 1st Infantry Division was tasked with seizing Sepon. In a series of air assaults, the ARVN secured landing zones around Sepon and eventually captured the town on March 7.
However, the capture of Sepon was a pyrrhic victory. The ARVN was deep inside enemy territory, facing mounting casualties and logistical challenges. A withdrawal was ordered, and the retreat from Sepon was chaotic and costly. The ARVN units faced relentless ambushes and heavy casualties. The withdrawal exposed the limitations of relying solely on helicopter transport, as anti-aircraft fire and rugged terrain hampered resupply and evacuation efforts. All told, US helicopters sent over 164,000 supply drops into Laos.
However, the capture of Sepon was a pyrrhic victory. The ARVN was deep inside enemy territory, facing mounting casualties and logistical challenges. A withdrawal was ordered, and the retreat from Sepon was chaotic and costly. The ARVN units faced relentless ambushes and heavy casualties. The withdrawal exposed the limitations of relying solely on helicopter transport, as anti-aircraft fire and rugged terrain hampered resupply and evacuation efforts. All told, US helicopters sent over 164,000 supply drops into Laos.
The Legacy of Lam Son 719
Operation Lam Son 719 officially ended on March 25, 1971, after 45 days of combat. The operation resulted in heavy casualties for both sides. The ARVN lost nearly half of its force, with thousands killed or wounded, and significant losses in equipment, including tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery pieces. The US also suffered substantial losses, primarily in its helicopter force, with 600 aircraft destroyed or damaged.
The operation was a tactical and strategic failure for the ARVN and the US. While they inflicted heavy casualties on the NVA and temporarily disrupted the Ho Chi Minh Trail, they failed to achieve their primary objective of severing the supply route. The NVA quickly recovered and resumed its logistical operations. The operation exposed the limitations of the Vietnamization policy, demonstrating that the ARVN was not yet ready to fight effectively against the NVA without direct US ground support.
The political fallout from Lam Son 719 was significant. The operation fueled anti-war sentiment in the US and further eroded public confidence in the South Vietnamese government. It demonstrated the resilience and determination of the NVA, who proved to be a formidable adversary capable of adapting and overcoming significant challenges.
The operation was a tactical and strategic failure for the ARVN and the US. While they inflicted heavy casualties on the NVA and temporarily disrupted the Ho Chi Minh Trail, they failed to achieve their primary objective of severing the supply route. The NVA quickly recovered and resumed its logistical operations. The operation exposed the limitations of the Vietnamization policy, demonstrating that the ARVN was not yet ready to fight effectively against the NVA without direct US ground support.
The political fallout from Lam Son 719 was significant. The operation fueled anti-war sentiment in the US and further eroded public confidence in the South Vietnamese government. It demonstrated the resilience and determination of the NVA, who proved to be a formidable adversary capable of adapting and overcoming significant challenges.
By Digby Greenhalgh
Digby Greenhalgh is the founder of Explore Indochina, and a recognized expert on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. All motorcycle tours are designed and guided by Digby.
Recent Posts
Oscar 8
US Special Forces suffered a devastating defeat while attacking an NVA base deep inside Laos
The Planet’s Most Heavily Bombed Areas
Some areas of the Ho Chi Minh Trail are completely riddled with bomb craters
